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1 Introduction
The number of people infected with coronavirus (COVID-19) in 2019 is more than 34 million
worldwide as of October 2, 2020, which makes it a true pandemic (WHO, 2020). Countries around
the world are implementing various policies to control the spread of the disease through trial and
error. Specifically, governments are implementing policies to reduce the chance of contact with the
disease in order to reduce the rate of infection. Yoo and Managi (2020) argue that such a policy
for COVID-19 would save lives and would consequently result in a more controlled economic loss
from the view of the value of statistical life. Furthermore, Nakamura and Managi (2020) show
that reducing air travel decreases the risk of importation and exportation of COVID-19. There are
two types of policies that restrict behavior to prevent the spread of infectious diseases: enforceable
behavioral restrictions that take into account penalties through the legal system, and behavioral
restrictions that are left to the people’s self-control without the use of the legal system (unenforceable
behavioral restrictions).
Enforced behavioral restrictions are implemented by the policies of several European countries.
The state of public health emergency, which was imposed in France, allows the Prime Minister,
with the advice of the Minister of Health, to immediately implement a series of restrictive measures
applicable throughout the country, which is a legally binding policy (France 24, 2020). Individuals
who go out for purposes other than those authorized by the government, such as the purchase of
living essentials, are fined between 135—3,700 Euros. In Italy, where the number of COVID-19-
related deaths is at 35,968 as of October 2, 2020 (COVID-19 Situazione Italia, 2020), a decree was
passed on March 10, 2020, imposing a nationwide curfew, with penalties of up to 3,000 Euros for
those who do not carry a “certificate” stating the place and reason they had to go out. The United
States has the highest number of cases worldwide as of October 2, 2020, with 7.4 million people
infected and deaths at 211,000 (The COVID Tracking Project, 2020). New York State, which
declared a state of emergency on March 7, mandated in principle, 100% telecommuting starting
March 22 through the governor’s order. Companies can be fined up to 10,000 US dollars if they do
not follow through and cause severe physical harm to their employees.
In contrast, some countries imposed a non-legally binding policy based on individuals’ self-
restraint without enforcement. In Japan, the government succeeded in declaring a state of emer-
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gency, which is not legally binding, and thus significantly restrained people from going out. (The
Japan Times, 2020a; Kyodo News, 2020; Katafuchi et al., 2020). It is widely considered to have
been more successful in controlling the number of infections than in other OECD countries (Lu
et al., 2020; Iwasaki and Grubaugh, 2020). The question is how many people in Japan refrain from
going out under the non-binding declaration of a state of emergency? We consider the interaction
between infection risk, stigma, and the player’s decision-making, to answer this question. In Japan,
the phenomenon of the “self-restraint police” (Jishuku Keisatsu in Japanese) emerged under the
state of emergency. The “self-restraint polic” is a colloquial term for ordinary citizens who pri-
vately crack down on or attack individuals or shops that do not respond to government requests to
refrain from going out or doing business. They have posted expletives on the doors of restaurants
where they operate and scratched cars with out-of-prefecture plates (The Japan Times, 2020c,b).
The self-restraint police symbolize the stigma against those who do not comply with requests for
self-restraint. This suggests that even unenforceable policies can discourage people from going out
in order to avoid social stigma. We specifically apply an evolutionary game to analyze self-restraint
behavior in the context of infectious disease epidemics from a stigmatization perspective.
Research on stigma has evolved around social psychology (Major et al., 2018), beginning with
the discussion by Goffman (1963). There are also several studies on stigma in economics; Moffitt
(1983); Besley and Coate (1992); Bhargava and Manoli (2015) study welfare stigma (Lindbeck et al.,
1999; Kurita et al., Forthcoming; Itaya and Kurita, 2020), Rasmusen (1996) analyzes the stigma
related to criminal record, Kim (2003) analyzes the stigma against tax evasion, and Ennis and
Weinberg (2013) investigate financial stigma.
It is important to analyze stigma in considering outgoing behavior during an infectious disease
epidemic, as it may play a similar role in fear of infection risk. Katafuchi et al. (2020) provide
both theoretical and empirical analyzes of how non-legally binding policies induce people’s self-
restraint behavior. They suppose that the player going out suffers psychological costs generated
from the stigma of going out and the infection risk in their theoretical model. Their theoretical
analysis shows that under a declared state of emergency players refrain from going out because
of the strong psychological costs reinforced by such a non-legally binding policy. Katafuchi et al.
(2020) empirically suggest that more people in Japan refrained from going outside under a declared
state of emergency, even after controlling for confounding factors such as the risk of infection, daily
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precipitation, and daily sunshine hours, by using Google mobility data. They explain the stigma of
going out under the state of emergency as follows:
In Japan, under the state of emergency, it was a social norm to refrain from going out.
Public opinion was that going out under the state of emergency was anti-social behavior.
In other words, people who go out under the state of emergency are stigmatized by
society as having inferior ethics because they do not follow social norms.
We suppose that the psychological costs of stigma are intensified under a declared state of emergency
in the model. As a result, we show that the number of people going out in the steady state under
the declared state of emergency is less than that without it.
Several empirical studies analyze the effect of Japan’s non-legally enforceable emergency decla-
rations (Kobayashi et al., 2020; Katafuchi et al., 2020; Yamamura and Tsutsui, 2020). Kobayashi
et al. (2020) show that the declaration and extension of the state of emergency has resulted in
some success in controlling the COVID-19 pandemic. Other studies analyze the effect of a legally
binding lockdown on the economy (Acemoglu et al., 2020; Alvarez et al., 2020; Farboodi et al., 2020;
Holtemo¨ller, 2020; Eichenbaum et al., 2020; Gharehgozli et al., 2020; Mandel and Veetil, 2020; Mar-
tin et al., 2020). Acemoglu et al. (2020) and Alvarez et al. (2020) discuss the optimal lockdown
policy using the theoretical model. Mandel and Veetil (2020) estimate the costs of a lockdown in
some sectors of the global economy using a multi-sector disequilibrium model.
We present an investigation of the evolutionary model, specifically, the replicator dynamics of
self-restraint behavior under the situation in which stigma and risk of infection are changed with
the number of players going out. Evolutionary game and replicator dynamics have been widely
studied and applied in economics Taylor and Jonker (1978); Weibull (1997); Kandori et al. (1993);
Safarzyn´ska and Van den Bergh (2011); Cerqueti et al. (2013); Wood et al. (2016); Shi et al. (2017);
Wu (2018); Yang et al. (2018); Wu (2019); Alger et al. (2020); Norman (2020); Itaya and Kurita
(2020)1. Replicator dynamics was first modeled by Taylor and Jonker (1978) and has since been
applied in many fields and for various issues. For instance, Safarzyn´ska and Van den Bergh (2011)
analyzed technological change using replicator dynamics, Cerqueti et al. (2013) and Shi et al. (2017)
consider a dynamic perspective of economic interactions and social tolerance applying it, and Itaya
1Safarzyn´ska and van den Bergh (2010) presents a very useful survey of evolutionary economic modeling.
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and Kurita (2020) analyze the replicator dynamics of welfare fraud and incomplete take-up welfare
in welfare benefit programs.
Although there are a growing number of studies on COVID-19, there are few studies that consider
stigma. One of the few exceptions is Katafuchi et al. (2020), as mentioned above. They analyzed
the theoretical model with stigma and infection risk and empirically tested the theoretical results
using mobility data. However, they consider infection risk as exogenous, and this assumption is
strict. Moreover, their model defines the fixed point of the number of going out as an equilibrium
point. This means that all players are rational enough to calculate each payoff and expect the
number of players going out at least in equilibrium. Finally, they analyze the static model, but the
situation pandemics of infection drastically change over time.
This study contributes in the following ways. First, we endogenize not only stigma cost but
also infection risk and weaken the rationality that players are claimed to attain equilibrium using
replicator dynamics, to beyond three concerns in the previous research mentioned above. Second,
we show that the state of emergency has an effect on players’ self-restraint behavior in the steady
state. Third, our comparative static analysis indicates that intensifying the stigma cost does not
necessarily induce the reduction in the number of players going out.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we present the basic setting
of the model and the replicator dynamics. Section 4 investigates whether the non-legally binding
policy induces self-restraint behavior. Section 5 presents the results of comparative statics. Section
6 conducts the welfare analysis. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
This study follows the basic setting of Katafuchi et al. (2020). However, our theoretical model
differs from previous studies that use a static model in that it is a dynamic analysis. We consider
an economy with a population of N economic agents. For simplicity, N is assumed to be constant
in time. There are two actions or strategy types: Going-out and Staying-home. Let x(t) be the
share of going-out players in the total population at time t.
Let us suppose that agents play the game represented in Table 1 after random matching. In
Table 1, piaiaj corresponds to player i’s payoff when player i’s action is ai and player j’s action is
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Table 1: Payoff Matrix
Going Staying home
Going (piGG, piGG) (piGS , piSG)
Staying home (piSG, piGS) (piSS , piSS)
aj , where ai, aj ∈ {G,S}, G is an abbreviation for “Going out” and S is for “Staying home” piGG,
piGS , piSG, and piSS are set as follows:
piGG = piGS = uout − γ(x)c− σs(x), (1)
piSG = piSS = uhome. (2)
Here, x is the proportion of players going out to the total population, uout is the utility from going
out, uhome is the utility from staying home, γ(x)c is the subjective expected cost of infection with
the virus, γ(x) is the subjective probability of infection with the virus, c is the cost of infection
with the virus, σs(x) is the stigma cost of going out, σ is the relative size of stigma cost to infection
cost, s(x) is the stigma cost function. We assume that the subjective probability of infection with
the virus is an increasing function with the proportion of players going out in the total population
as follows:
γ(x) = ηx, (3)
where η(> 0) is the parameter indicating the degree of increase in the subjective probability of
infection of more people going out. Moreover, we assume that the stigma cost is a decreasing
function with the proportion of players going out in the total population as follows:
s(x) = ζ0 − ζ1x, (4)
where ζ0(> 0) is the fixed stigma cost, ζ1x is the flexible stigma cost, and ζ1(> 0) is the degree of
stigma reduction of more people going out. This formulation of stigma cost is based on Lindbeck
et al. (1999) and Katafuchi et al. (2020). We assume that s(1) = ζ0−ζ1 > 0. This assumption means
that the lowest level of stigma cost is not zero and positive. We make the following assumption:
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Assumption 1
ηc > σζ1 (5)
Assumption (1) implies that the marginal cost of increasing the number of players going out is
higher than their marginal benefit.
3 Replicator dynamics
Next, we show the replicator dynamics of the population share of players going out in the model.
For the sake, we need to check the expected payoff of each strategy. The expected payoff of going
out and staying home are, respectively:
E[G] = xpiGG + (1− x)piGS , (6)
and
E[S] = xpiSG + (1− x)piSS . (7)
The replicator dynamics of the going-out share in the total population is modeled by the following
differential equation:
x˙ = x(1− x)(E[G] − E[S]). (8)
Substituting Equations (1) and (2) into Equation (9), we can transform Equation (8) as follows:
x˙ = x(1− x) [uout − uhome − γ(x)c− σs(x)] . (9)
We derive the stationary point in the dynamics by solving (9), x˙ = 0, as follows:
x∗ = 0, xˆ, 1, (10)
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where
xˆ =
uout − uhome − σζ0
ηc− σζ1
. (11)
The condition for the interior stationary point is given, as shown in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The necessary and sufficient condition in order that xˆ ∈ (0, 1), is given by
σζ0 < uout − uhome < ηc+ σ(ζ0 − ζ1) (12)
Proof. First, the condition for xˆ is positive is given by:
xˆ > 0,
uout − uhome − σζ0
ηc− σζ1
> 0,
uout − uhome − σζ0 > 0,
Hence,
uout − uhome > σζ0. (13)
Second, the condition for xˆ is less than 1 is given by
xˆ < 1,
uout − uhome − σζ0
ηc− σζ1
< 1,
uout − uhome − σζ0 < ηc− σζ1,
Thus,
uout − uhome < ηc+ σ(ζ0 − ζ1). (14)
From Conditions (13) and (14), the necessary and sufficient condition in order that xˆ ∈ (0, 1) is
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given by
σζ0 < uout − uhome < ηc+ σ(ζ0 − ζ1)
The stability analysis presents us with the following results:
Proposition 1 The interior stationary point x∗ = xˆ is uniquely stable and x∗ = 0, 1 is unstable if
an interior steady state exists.
Proof. We use the linear approximation method to check the stability in the stationary point.
Differentiating x˙ with respect to x yields the following result:
dx˙
dx
= (1− 2x) [uout − uhome − γ(x)c− σs(x)] ,−x(1− x)
[
γ′(x)c+ σs′(x)
]
(15)
First, we check the stability condition for x∗ = 0. Substituting x∗ = 0 into Equation (15), we
obtain the following results:
dx˙
dx
∣
∣
∣
∣
x∗=0
= uout − uhome − σζ0 (16)
Thus, the stationary point x∗ = 0 is stable if uout − uhome < σζ0 and is otherwise unstable.
Second, we check the stability condition for x∗ = xˆ. Substituting x∗ = xˆ into Equation (15), we
obtain the following results:
dx˙
dx
∣
∣
∣
∣
x∗=xˆ
= −xˆ(1− xˆ) [ηc− σζ1] (17)
The sign of (17) is negative from Assumption 1. Thus, the stationary point x∗ = x1 is stable.
Third, we confirm the stability condition for x∗ = 1. Substituting x∗ = 1 into Equation (15),
we obtain the following results:
dx˙
dx
∣
∣
∣
∣
x∗=1
= − [uout − uhome − ηc− σ(ζ0 − ζ1)] (18)
Hence, the stationary point x∗ = 1 is stable if uout−uhome > ηc+σ(ζ0−ζ1) and unstable otherwise.
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By summing up the above stability conditions and Lemma 1, we conclude that the interior steady
state x∗ = xˆ is uniquely stable and x∗ = 0, 1 are unstable if an interior steady state exists.
Proposition 1 suggests that the interior steady state, xˆ, is stable when it exists. Figure 1 shows
the dynamics of the population share of players going out and stationary points. There are three
stationary points, x∗ = 0, xˆ, 1. We can confirm that x∗ = xˆ is stable and x∗ = 0, 1 are unstable, as
shown in Figure 1.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.02
0.04
0.06
?̇?
𝑥
#𝑥
Figure 1: Steady states without the state of emergency
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of x with parameters as follows: uout = 1, uhome = 0.05,
η = 1, c = 1.5,σ = 0.5, ζ0 = 0.5, and ζ1 = 0.25.
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4 Effect of the non-legally binding state of emergency
Our aim is to investigate the effect of the non-legally binding policy on the stationary point. We
introduce the policy variable ι ∈ {0, 1} as follows:
piGG = piGS = uout − γ(x)c− (1 + ρι)σs(x), (19)
where ι is the indicator variable of the state of emergency and ρ > 0 is a parameter that expresses
how much stigma is amplified by the state of emergency. That is, this setting implies that stigma
costs are enhanced by (1 + ρ) times more under the state of emergency than they would otherwise
be. Let xˆ1 denote the interior stationary point under the state of emergency and xˆ0 that without
the state of emergency. xˆ0 is equal to the right-hand side of (11) because xˆ = xˆ0. The stationary
points without the state of emergency are given as follows:
x∗ = 0, xˆ0, 1, (20)
where
xˆ0 =
uout − uhome − σζ0
ηc− σζ1
. (21)
We can derive the stationary point under the state of emergency as follows:
x∗ = 0, xˆ1, 1, (22)
where
xˆ1 =
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
. (23)
The condition for the interior stationary point to exist under the state of emergency is given as
shown in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The necessary and sufficient condition in order that xˆι=1 ∈ (0, 1) under the state of
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emergency is given by
(1 + ρ)σζ0 < uout − uhome < ηc+ (1 + ρ)σ(ζ0 − ζ1), (24)
Proof. First, the condition for xˆ is positive is given by:
xˆι=1 > 0,
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
> 0,
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0 > 0,
Hence,
uout − uhome > (1 + ρ)σζ0. (25)
Second, the condition for xˆ is less than 1 is given by
xˆι=1 < 1,
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
< 1,
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0 < ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1,
Thus,
uout − uhome < ηc+ (1 + ρ)σ(ζ0 − ζ1). (26)
From Conditions (25) and (26), the necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that xˆι=1 ∈ (0, 1)
is given by
(1 + ρ)σζ0 < uout − uhome < ηc+ (1 + ρ)σ(ζ0 − ζ1),
Lemma 2 shows that the conditions for the existence of the interior stationary point under the
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non-legally binding state of emergency is similar to that in 1.
The stability analysis at the stationary points under the state of emergency presents the following
results:
Proposition 2 Under the state of emergency, the interior stationary point x∗ = xˆ1 is uniquely
stable and x∗ = 0, 1 is unstable if the interior steady state exists.
Proof. We use the linear approximation method to investigate the stability at the stationary point.
The replicator dynamics of the population share of players going out is given by
x˙ι=1 = x(1− x) [uout − uhome − γ(x)c− (1 + ρ)σs(x)] . (27)
Differentiating (27) with respect to x yields the following result:
dx˙
dx
= (1− 2x) [uout − uhome − γ(x)c− (1 + ρ)σs(x)] ,−x(1− x)
[
γ′(x)c+ (1 + ρ)σs′(x)
]
(28)
First, we check the stability condition for x∗ = 0. Substituting x∗ = 0 into Equation (28), we
obtain the following results:
dx˙
dx
∣
∣
∣
∣
x∗=0
= uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0 (29)
Thus, the stationary point x∗ = 0 is stable if uout − uhome < (1 + ρ)σζ0 and is otherwise unstable.
Second, we check the stability condition for x∗ = xˆ. Substituting x∗ = xˆι=1 into Equation (28),
we obtain the following results:
dx˙
dx
∣
∣
∣
∣
x∗=xˆ1
= −xˆι=1(1− xˆι=1) [ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1] (30)
The sign of (30) is negative because Assumption (1). Thus, the stationary point x∗ = x1 is stable.
Third, we confirm the stability condition for x∗ = 1. Substituting x∗ = 1 into Equation (28),
we obtain the following results:
dx˙
dx
∣
∣
∣
∣
x∗=1
= − [uout − uhome − ηc− (1 + ρ)σ(ζ0 − ζ1)] (31)
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Hence, the stationary point x∗ = 1 is stable if uout − uhome > (1 + ρ)ηc + σ(ζ0 − ζ1) and unstable
otherwise. By summing up the above stability conditions and Lemma 2, we conclude that the
interior steady state x∗ = xˆ is uniquely stable and x∗ = 0, 1 are unstable if an interior steady state
exists.
Proposition 2 shows that the interior stationary point is stable and other stationary points
are unstable, although there are three stationary points, x∗ = 0, xˆ1, 1, as in Proposition 1. From
Proposition 1 and 2, we need to compare each interior stationary point in order to consider the
effect of the non-legal policy as the state of emergency.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-0.10
-0.05
0.05
?̇?
𝑥
#𝑥!#𝑥"
Figure 2: Effect of the state of emergency
Notes: The figure shows the numerical plot of x˙|ι=0 drawn by solid line and x˙|ι=1 drawn by dash
line with parameters as follows: uout = 1, uhome = 0.05, η = 1, c = 1.5, σ = 0.5, ζ0 = 0.5,
ζ1 = 0.25, ρ = 1.5.
We obtain the following proposition about the effects of the state of emergency.
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Proposition 3 The state of emergency, which is a non-legally binding policy, has the effect of
restraining the player’s going-out behavior, that is, xˆ1 − xˆ0 < 0, under the following condition:
uout − uhome <
ζ0
ζ1
ηc. (32)
Proof. The difference between xˆ1 and xˆ0 is given as follows:
xˆ1 − xˆ0 =
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
,−
uout − uhome − σζ0
ηc− σζ1
, (33)
From (33), the condition for xˆ1 − xˆ0 < 0 is given by
uout − uhome <
ζ0
ζ1
ηc. (34)
Figure 2 shows the numerical plot of evolution of x with and without the non-legally binding
state of emergency. The stable interior stationary point uniquely exist in each dynamic. We can
confirm that xˆ1 is lower than xˆ0. That is, the non-legally binding state of emergency can reduce
the share of going-out players through self-restraint behavior.
The condition (32) in Proposition 3 means that the state of emergency is effective when the gain
of going out is low, the fixed stigma cost is high, the degree of stigma reduction of players going
out is higher, the cost of infection is high, and the degree of increase in the subjective probability
of infection of more players going out is high.
5 Comparative static analysis
We conduct a comparative static analysis to investigate the impact of varying each parameter (uout,
uhome, η, c, σ, ρ, ζ0, and ζ1) on the equilibrium number of players going out. The results are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Results in the comparative static analysis are given as follows:
1. An increase in the utility from going out (uout) raises the equilibrium share of players going
out in the total population under the state of emergency and without it.
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2. An increase in the utility from staying home (uhome) reduces the equilibrium share of players
going out in the total population under the state of emergency and without it.
3. An increase in the degree of rise in the subjective probability of infection of more people going
out (η) reduces the equilibrium share of players going out in the total population under the
state of emergency and without it.
4. An increase in the cost of infection (c) reduces the equilibrium share of players going out in
the total population under the state of emergency and without it.
5. An increase in the relative size of stigma (σ) reduces or increases the equilibrium share of
players going out in the total population under the state of emergency and without it.
6. An increase in the degree of stigma amplified by the state of emergency (ρ) reduces or in-
creases the equilibrium share of players going out in the total population under the state of
emergency whereas it does not affect the share without the state of emergency.
7. An increase in the fixed stigma cost (ζ0) reduces the equilibrium share of players going out
in the total population under the state of emergency and without it.
8. An increase in the degree of stigma reduction of more people going out (ζ1) raises the equi-
librium share of players going out in the total population under the state of emergency and
without it.
Proof.
1. We investigate the effect of an increase in the utility from going out in the equilibrium. The
effect on the equilibrium under the state of emergency is given as follows:
∂xˆ1
∂uout
=
1
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
> 0, (35)
while the effect on the equilibrium without the state of emergency is given by:
∂xˆ0
∂uout
=
1
ηc− σζ1
> 0. (36)
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2. The effect of an increase in the utility from staying home on the equilibrium under the state
of emergency is given as follows:
∂xˆ1
∂uout
= −
1
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
< 0, (37)
while the effect on the equilibrium without the state of emergency is given by:
∂xˆ0
∂uout
= −
1
ηc− σζ1
< 0. (38)
3. The effect of an increase in the degree of rise in the subjective probability of infection of more
people going out on the equilibrium under the state of emergency is given as follows:
∂xˆ1
∂η
= −
c [uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0]
[ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1]
2 < 0, (39)
while the effect on the equilibrium without the state of emergency is given by:
∂xˆ0
∂η
= −
c [uout − uhome − σζ0]
(ηc− σζ1)
2 < 0. (40)
4. The effect of an increase in the cost of infection on the equilibrium under the state of emergency
is given as follows:
∂xˆ1
∂η
= −
η [uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0]
[ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1]
2 < 0, (41)
while the effect on the equilibrium without the state of emergency is given by:
∂xˆ0
∂η
= −
η [uout − uhome − σζ0]
(ηc− σζ1)
2 < 0. (42)
5. The effect of an increase in the relative size of stigma on the equilibrium under the state of
emergency is given as follows:
∂xˆ1
∂σ
= −
(1 + ρ)ζ0
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
+
[uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0] (1 + ρ)ζ1
,
[ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1]
2 R 0, (43)
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while the effect on the equilibrium without the state of emergency is given by:
∂xˆ0
∂σ
= −
ζ0
ηc− σζ1
+
(uout − uhome − σζ0) ζ1
(ηc− σζ1)
2 R 0. (44)
6. The effect of an increase in the degree of stigma amplified by the state of emergency on the
equilibrium under the state of emergency is given as follows:
∂xˆ1
∂ρ
= −
σζ0
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
+
[uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0]σζ1
[ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1]
2 R 0, (45)
while the effect on the equilibrium without the state of emergency is given by:
∂xˆ0
∂ρ
= 0. (46)
7. The effect of an increase in the fixed stigma cost on the equilibrium under the state of emer-
gency is given as follows:
∂xˆ1
∂ζ0
= −
(1 + ρ)σ
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
< 0, (47)
while the effect on the equilibrium without the state of emergency is given by:
∂xˆ0
∂ζ0
= −
σ
ηc− σζ1
< 0. (48)
8. The effect of an increase in the degree of stigma reduction of more people going out on the
equilibrium under the state of emergency is given as follows:
∂xˆ1
∂ζ1
=
(1 + ρ)σ [uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0]
[ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1]
2 > 0, (49)
while the effect on the equilibrium without the state of emergency is given by:
∂xˆ0
∂ζ1
=
σ [uout − uhome − σζ0]
(ηc− σζ1)
2 > 0. (50)
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Most of the results of Proposition 4 are consistent with our supposition. In fact, an increase in
the utility from going out (uout) and the degree of stigma reduction of more people going out (ζ1)
raise the number of players going out because the incentive to go out increases. In contrast, an
increase in the utility from staying home (uhome), the degree of increase in the subjective probability
of infection of more people going out (η), the cost of infection (c), and the fixed stigma cost (ζ0)
reduce the number of players going out because the incentive to go out decreases.
However, an increase in the relative size of stigma σ and the degree of stigma amplified by the
state of emergency ρ can raise or reduce the number of players going out, although intuitively it
reduces that. This result arises from the indirect effect that occurs through the channel as follows:
First, intensifying the stigma cost reduces the number of players going out. Second, a decrease
in players going out reduces infection risk, and finally, players have an incentive to go out from
weakening infection risk.
6 Welfare analysis
In this section, we conduct the welfare analysis. Let W denote social welfare and it is given by:
W = xE[G] + (1− x)E[S],
= x [uout − γ(x)c− (1 + ιρ)σs(x)] + (1− x)uhome,
= x [uout − ηcx− (1 + ιρ)σ (ζ0 − ζ1x)] + (1− x)uhome. (51)
Let xopt denote the socially optimal level of population share of players going out. The following
proposition presents the relationship between the equilibrium level and the socially optimal level of
x.
Proposition 5 The interior equilibrium level of the population share of players going out is larger
than the socially optimal level without/under the state of emergency, that is, xˆ0 > x
opt
ι=0, xˆ1 > x
opt
ι=1.
Proof. Substituting ι = 0 into Equation (51), we obtain the following:
W (x)|ι=0 = x [uout − ηcx− σ (ζ0 − ζ1x)] + (1− x)uhome. (52)
18
The first order condition and the second order condition are given by:
dW (x)|ι=0
dx
= uout − uhome − σζ0 + 2(σζ1 − ηc)x, (53)
d2W (x)|ι=0
dx2
= 2(σζ1 − ηc) < 0. (54)
The socially optimal level of population share of going-out players without the state of emergency
is given as follows:
x
opt
ι=0 =
uout − uhome − σζ0
2 [ηc− σζ1]
<
uout − uhome − σζ0
ηc− σζ1
= xˆ0. (55)
Next, substituting ι = 1 into Equation (51), we obtain the following:
W (x)|ι=1 = x [uout − ηcx− (1 + ρ)σ (ζ0 − ζ1x)] + (1− x)uhome. (56)
The first order condition and the second order condition are given by:
dW (x)|ι=1
dx
= uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0 + 2 [(1 + ρ)σζ1 − ηc]x, (57)
d2W (x)|ι=1
dx2
= 2 [(1 + ρ)σζ1 − ηc]x < 0. (58)
The socially optimal level of population share of players going out under the state of emergency is
given as follows:
x
opt
ι=1 =
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0
2 [ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1]
<
uout − uhome − (1 + ρ)σζ0
ηc− (1 + ρ)σζ1
= xˆ1. (59)
Proposition 5 suggests that the level of population share of players going out in the interior
equilibrium is larger than the socially optimal level without the state of emergency, and it is the
same under the state of emergency. These results are generated from the existence of the externality
in the model. Infection risk is assumed to be the increasing function with respect to the population
share of going-out players and stigma is assumed to be the decreasing function with that. That is,
an increase in the number of people out of the house creates a negative externality of higher risk of
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infection and a positive externality of weaker stigma. Because each player considers the externalities
for individual level, the equilibrium population share of players going out is excessive compared to
the socially optimal level.
7 Conclusion
This study analyzes the interaction between self-restraint behavior, infection risk, and stigma against
going out by using replicator dynamics. As a result, there are three steady states in population
share of going-out players: x∗ = 0, xˆ, 1, however the interior stationary point, xˆ, is only stable
(Proposition 1). We show that the non-legally binding policy reduces the number of people going
out in the steady state by intensifying stigma costs (Proposition 3). This result is consistent with
the empirical result in Katafuchi et al. (2020). Our comparative static analysis indicates that
intensifying the stigma cost does not necessarily induce the reduction in the number of players
going out because of the indirect effect of decrease in infection risk (Proposition 4). This suggests
the policy implication that there is a possibility that intensifying social pressure cannot reduce the
going-out behavior. Finally, the welfare analysis presents the result, which is the number of players
going out is larger than the socially optimal level without/under the state of emergency (Proposition
5).
This study does not take into account any self-restraint on the part of suppliers, such as restau-
rants. However, the “self-restraint police” stigmatized not only going-out people but also operating
restaurants under a declared state of emergency. We will need to analyze supply-side and household
restraint behavior, as well as for changes in the number of people infected and the economy. In
our model, stigma cost and infection risk are assumed to be linear function with respect to the
population share of going-out people. We will give their functions microfoundation for future work.
Social stigma is important to consider the fight against COVID-19 because it reduces the spread
of infection through individual self-restraint behavior. We have to be careful with the negative side
of stigma or social pressures. The reason is, as history has shown, extreme stigmatization can lead
to discrimination, prejudice, and violence.
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